I think your article is about those forces in that context.īut I react to the words « expeditionary », « Rwanda » and « Cost/benefit ». Special forces can be viewed from a purely military perspective, as a speciaLISED force to be used in conjunction with the rest of the armed forces the paratrooper of WW2 is such a force. It's not a thread derailment, I shall explain further. IMHO you're not addressing concept like « coloured revolutions » as often as you should. Seriously, if everyone in the entire country of Rwanda died tomorrow, would it matter at all? Reply Delete Count me out of this ridiculous doctrine! Maybe Rettaw is an admirer of Samantha Power, Susan Rice, and other clueless liberal busybodies prattling on about the totally bogus "responsibility to protect". Who cares? There's oil in Sudan, but not that much (and it can be bought with money anyway).Īs far as Srebenica goes, I again say who cares? The vain and turbulent Balkan peoples have been feuding and fighting since the beginning of time, and there's no reason to suspect they'll ever stop. The Darfur issue is even less important than Rwanda, as the violence in the Sudan is almost completely contained. Perhaps ethnic groups farther afield in Africa related to the Tutsis had cause for concern as well, but I'm not too informed on the ethnic boundaries in Africa (neither are other Westerners-another reason not to intervene). The Rwandan genocide, at most, was a strategic concern to the states immediately bordering Rwanda. The premature termination of life in some dusty land no one has ever heard of does not merit the maintenance of massive expeditionary military forces, nor is it cause to intervene in other states. It's just a preoccupation of liberal imperialists who are obsessed with human life. Genocide is generally not a strategic concern, unless coupled with extraterritorial aggression (e.g. *this is a "any cost" taken to be within reasonable limits, obviously total annihilation of one side is not a reasonable cost, even if the sides happens to be the aggressor. It should be contrasted to interventions that seek to resolve the underlying conflict fairly before it has progressed to the point that genocide is considered. This type of "preventive intervention" has the downside that the intervening party could well be the first actor to use violence, and thus de facto become the aggressor. The simplest example would be that the intervening party uses force to completely halt the suspect aggressors from carrying out any action. Having established the need to minimize the completion of a genocide event, we consider how to do "preventive intervention". Of course, the total prevention of genocide events is much desired over only partial prevention, ie when prevention actions are launched only after a genocide plan has been put into action by the aggressor. This need arises from the combination of the enormous damage the aggressor seek to inflict, and the short time within which that goal can be accomplished. In particular, the demonstrate that there are indeed situations where they UN should intervene with much violence (if needed, typically it is) to prevent the goal of an aggressor. I think the events in Rawanda, Srebrenica and Dafur are clear examples of situations where we all should feel morally obligated to intervene at any* cost.
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